The 27th Constitutional Amendment: Redefining Pakistan’s Power Structure

The Twenty-Seventh Amendment to the Constitution of Pakistan passed by the Senate on 10 November 2025 and passed by the National Assembly on 12 November 2025 with only a few minor amendments, marks one of the most sweeping constitutional overhauls in decades. Presented as a reformist step to streamline governance and strengthen institutional efficiency, it has nonetheless sparked widespread debate over its far-reaching consequences for Pakistan’s judiciary, defence establishment, and constitutional balance of power.

Perhaps the most transformative feature is the establishment of a Federal Constitutional Court, vested with exclusive jurisdiction over constitutional interpretation, intergovernmental disputes, and related matters. The Supreme Court, under this model, will primarily function as an appellate forum, a significant shift from its historical role as the sole guardian of the Constitution.

Judges of the FCC will retire at 68 (three years later than Supreme Court judges), and the Chief Justice will serve a fixed three-year term. The Judicial Commission of Pakistan gains new powers to transfer High Court judges, with refusal to accept transfer deemed equivalent to retirement.

The amendment revises Article 243, altering the command architecture of the armed forces. The office of the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee will be abolished by late November 2025, replaced by a single command under a newly created Chief of Defence Forces (CDF) a position that consolidates authority over all three services: army, navy, and air force.

Honorary ranks such as Field Marshal, Marshal of the Air Force, and Admiral of the Fleet are now constitutionally recognized, with lifetime privileges and limited immunity, signaling both institutional continuity and consolidation of senior military influence.

The amendment also introduces stringent clauses barring dual nationals or those holding foreign citizenship from serving as judges or in key public offices. The revised Articles 177, 193, and 208 restrict eligibility for appointment to the superior judiciary and other constitutional offices, ostensibly to reinforce undivided national loyalty but effectively narrowing the field for overseas Pakistanis long engaged in public service and reform initiatives.

A total of 48 constitutional articles are affected. While proponents describe the changes as necessary harmonization of governance, critics view them as recentralization of power curbing provincial autonomy achieved under the 18th Amendment. The new structures may allow greater federal oversight in judicial, administrative, and defence matters, reviving concerns about the erosion of the federation’s participatory spirit.

The creation of a parallel Federal Constitutional Court is viewed by many constitutional scholars as a direct dilution of the Supreme Court’s authority and an attempt to rebalance judicial independence vis-à-vis the executive. The provision allowing the Judicial Commission to compel judicial transfers further tightens administrative control over the judiciary’s internal functioning.

On the defence side, the merger of command under a single Chief of Defence Forces could streamline coordination among the services but simultaneously concentrates unprecedented power in one office, raising alarm over civilian-military equilibrium and institutional checks.

The dual-nationality bar, while symbolically appealing to nationalist sentiment, risks alienating Pakistan’s vast diaspora and discouraging globally qualified professionals from public service.

Equally striking is the extraordinary speed with which the amendment moved through Parliament. Introduced in the Senate on 8 November 2025, it was passed within two days, by 10 November, and transmitted to the National Assembly for expected approval the following day. Ordinarily, constitutional amendments undergo extensive debate, committee review, and cross-party negotiation often spanning months, if not years. The 27th Amendment, however, was expedited with rare political consensus or perhaps political convenience.

This legislative haste stands in sharp contrast to the fate of human rights-oriented bills, such as the ICT Child Marriage Restraint (Amendment) Bill, which languished for more than a decade before enactment. The contrast raises a telling question about parliamentary priorities why transformational institutional reforms move at lightning speed while social-protection laws crawl through procedural inertia.

The government has portrayed the amendment as a modernizing reform package one aimed at clarifying roles, preventing institutional overlap, and reinforcing national integrity. However, the lack of broad-based consultation, absence of provincial input, and the compressed legislative timeline suggest an approach driven more by political expediency than participatory constitutionalism.

The 27th Constitutional Amendment represents a historic shift in Pakistan’s constitutional landscape one that redefines the judiciary’s hierarchy, reconfigures military command, and redraws eligibility for public service. Its rapid passage underscores both the government’s legislative efficiency and its selective enthusiasm for reform. Whether this amendment strengthens Pakistan’s democratic architecture or merely concentrates power under new institutional labels will depend not on its text alone, but on how it is implemented and on whether future parliaments apply the same urgency to the people’s rights as they now do to the restructuring of power.